I Would if I Could: Precarious Employment and Childbearing Intentions in Italy by Modena, Francesca & Sabatini, Fabio
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
I Would if I Could: Precarious
Employment and Childbearing Intentions
in Italy
Francesca Modena and Fabio Sabatini
European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises
(Euricse)
22. October 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26117/
MPRA Paper No. 26117, posted 25. October 2010 07:51 UTC
I Would if I Could:  
Precarious Employment and Childbearing Intentions in Italy
*
 
 
Francesca Modena
ǂ
 and Fabio Sabatini
§ǂǂ
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper carries out an investigation into the socio-economic determinants of 
childbearing decisions made by couples in Italy. The analysis accounts for the 
characteristics of both possible parents. Our results do not support established theoretical 
predictions according to which the increase in the opportunity cost of motherhood 
connected to higher female labour participation is responsible for the fall in fertility. On 
the contrary, the instability of women’s work status (i.e. having occasional, precarious, 
and low-paid positions) is revealed as a significant dissuasive factor in the decision to 
have children. Couples in which there is an  unemployed woman are less likely to plan 
childbearing as well. Other relevant explanatory variables are women’s age, men’s work 
status and education, women’s citizenship, marital status and perceived economic well-
being.  
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1. Introduction 
Sometime in the next few years (if it hasn’t happened already) the world will reach a milestone: half 
of the population will bear only enough children to replace itself. That is, the fertility rate of half of 
the world’s countries will be 2.1 or below, resulting in slower population growth, and eventually 
stabilization. This is not necessarily bad news. According to the United Nations Population Division 
(2009), fast population growth, fuelled by high fertility, hinders the reduction of poverty and the 
achievement of other development goals. However, in countries experiencing a dramatic ageing of 
the population, such as Italy, the drop in the fertility rate brings about some worrisome side effects. 
First, low fertility substantially reduces the size of the labour force. Second, the decline in the 
workforce puts the actuarial sustainability of the current pension system at risk. Furthermore, with 
very low fertility, the reduction of the labour supply is most severe for younger workers. Young 
workers are the main assimilators of new technology, and countries that have a shortage of young 
skilled workers are more vulnerable to competition (McDonald 2008; McDonald and Temple 
2006). 
Theory commonly relates the fall in fertility to the rise of female participation in the labour market 
(Willis 1973; Becker 1981; Cigno 1991). In the 70s, consistent with this theory, the higher level of 
education achieved, and the related prospects for better work positions and higher earnings, raised 
the opportunity cost of not working, thereby causing a postponement of childbearing decisions, 
which in turn led to a fall in fertility rates (Adsera 2004; D’Addio and D’Ercole 2005).  
However, the relationship between female participation in the workforce and fertility has changed 
significantly over the last two decades. In the EU, the sign of the cross-country correlation has now 
become positive (Ahn and Mira 2002; Morgan 2003; Engelhardt et al. 2004; Billari and Kohler 
2004; for an alternative view see Kögel 2004). Still, the shift does not concern Italy, which, despite 
having one of the lowest female participation rates in Europe, still suffers from a markedly lower 
level of fertility. The Italian exception has been explained as the result of institutional and policy 
differences in comparison with Nordic countries where more generous protection systems have 
been implemented to reconcile motherhood with work (Bernhardt 1993; Gauthier 1996; Adsera 
2004; Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004; Del Boca and Sauer 2009).  
The empirical literature investigating the fall in fertility focuses almost only on women’s economic 
conditions and on actual fertility rates, somewhat neglecting the fact that: 1) in EU countries, the 
desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual rate (Eurostat 2001; Adsera 2006). 2) 
Family planning decisions are in most cases – as the term suggests – a family matter or, more 
specifically, a “couple-matter”. 
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Here we argue that, in addition to female participation on the one hand, and the pressure of the 
“biological clock” and of social and cultural factors on the other, one of the main issues a woman 
considers when deciding whether to have a child is: can we – i.e. my partner and I –afford it? 
Thus, rather than only analyzing the labour market participation of women – which has already 
been fruitfully addressed by a series of previous studies – we aim to add new insights to the debate 
by focusing on the “economic sustainability” of childbearing decisions at the family level. This 
choice is also related to the fact that, in most cases, childbearing is conceived in the context of a 
steady relationship. In Italy, single women and men desiring children are in fact still quite rare and, 
in some cases, even thwarted by law. 
The empirical studies tracing the differences between Northern and Southern Europe to the  
institutional framework of female participation reasonably account for social policies related to 
childcare assistance, parental leave arrangements, and the availability of part-time positions for 
women. Besides few exceptions (see for example Adsera 2004), the stability of the aspiring parents’ 
work status or, in other words, their “labour precariousness”, has so far been neglected. It is worth 
noting that the concept of labour precariousness is in general disregarded by the conventional 
literature, which considers it more as an obvious and somewhat desirable side effect of flexibility 
rather than as a crucial factor related to workers’ well-being. This view can be hardly generalized to 
Italy, where precarious workers are characterized by low income levels, inadequate social 
protection and discontinuous careers.In this paper, together with a series of conventional socio-
economic factors already considered by previous studies, we test the role of new labour market-
related variables which may influence the economic sustainability of the decision to have children. 
In particular, we focus on the stability of the work status. The main hypothesis we want to test here 
is that having a precarious job (i.e. unstable, low paid, and with scarce guarantees) is a deterrent to 
planning parenthood rather than a persuasive factor to childbearing through a decrease in the 
opportunity cost for women.   
Raw data is drawn from the 2006 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by 
the Bank of Italy covering 7,768 households composed of 19,551 individuals and 13,009 income-
earners. Territorial indicators used as control variables are taken from several other national data 
sources including Istat’s Quarterly survey on the labour force. 
Based on logistic regressions, our results do not support conventional economic theory predicting 
that the increase in the opportunity cost of motherhood connected to higher participation and wage 
rates necessarily leads to a decrease in fertility. Rather, we find evidence that being unemployed is a 
significant deterrent from planning to have children. More in general, women’s employment 
instability discourages childbearing aspirations. Couples where women are precarious (i.e. atypical, 
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temporary, and low-guaranteed) workers are in fact much less likely to plan to have children in the 
future. Other relevant explanatory variables are women’s age, men’s work status and education, 
women’s citizenship, marital status and perceived economic well-being. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we offer a synthetic 
background on Italy. In Section 3 we describe our hypotheses. In Sections 4 and 5 we describe data 
and methodology. In Section 6 we present and discuss our results. The paper closes with a brief 
discussion of the policy implications of the analysis. 
 
2. Background  
The relationship between education, labour market participation, and fertility has changed over 
time. Since the 1960s, the fertility rate has sharply decreased in most developed countries in 
correspondence with an increase in female labour participation rates. The world average total 
fertility rate fell from 2.9 in 1960 to 2.04 in 1975 and then to 1.6 in the late 1990s. Female labour 
force participation rates climbed to almost 48% in 1975, up from 41% in 1960 and dramatically 
increased to 64% by the late 1990s (Adsera 2004). From the second half of the 90s, the participation 
of women in the labour market continued to increase in all countries, but fertility rates started to 
decline at a slower rate or, in some cases, began to grow again. However, relevant differences can 
be observed across countries. In the European Union, the countries with the lowest fertility (Spain, 
Italy, and Greece) are those with relatively low levels of female labour force participation, while the 
countries with higher fertility rates (Denmark, France, and Sweden) show a relatively high female 
participation in the labour market. Italy, especially in the northern and central regions, became the 
title-holder of the so-called “lowest-low” fertility (Kohler et al. 2002; Castiglioni and Della Zuanna 
2009). During the last decade, fertility has slightly increased from the historical low of 1.19 
observed in 1995. The fertility rate in 2009 is estimated to be 1.41 resulting from a converging trend 
between the northern and southern regions (Istat 2010). This slight rise (Table 1) can be partly 
attributed to foreign women, whose fertility rate is on average one point higher than those of 
Italians (Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Fertility rate in the Italian regions 2006-2009 
 2006 2007 2008 2009* 
Italy 1.35 1.37 1.42 1.41 
North-West 1.37 1.40 1.46 1.45 
North-East 1.39 1.43 1.47 1.46 
Centre 1.31 1.32 1.41 1.37 
South 1.33 1.35 1.35 1.36 
Islands 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.36 
Source: Istat (2010) 
* Estimates 
 5 
 
Table 2. Fertility rate and average age at the first childbirth of Italian and foreign women in 2008 
Foreign Italian Total 
 
TFR Age TFR Age TFR Age 
Italy 2.31 27.9 1.32 31.7 1.42 31.1 
North-West 2.47 27.8 1.28 32.2 1.46 31.2 
North-East 2.49 28.0 1.27 32.2 1.47 31.1 
Centre 2.08 27.9 1.31 32.4 1.41 31.6 
South 1.92 27.5 1.34 30.9 1.35 30.8 
Islands 2.10 27.9 1.33 30.8 1.35 30.7 
Source: Istat (2010) 
 
 
Still, the Italian TFR remains one of the lowest in developed countries. According to the UN 
estimates, in a constant fertility scenario, only Germany and Japan will perform worse than Italy in 
2010-2015 (UN 2009). The fall in fertility has been accompanied by significant changes in the 
chronology of couples’ family planning choices. Mothers’ average age at the first childbirth, which 
had been quite stable at around 25 for a long time, gradually raised to the current threshold of 31.1 
(Istat 2010). As a consequence, the prevalent family model gradually changed as well, as the results 
of the General Census of the Population show (Istat 2001). The average family size fell from 3.35 in 
1971 to 3.01 in 1981, 2.83 in 1991, and 2.59 in 2001. It is noteworthy that first childbirth has been 
influenced by the fall in fertility in just a very slight way: according to a survey on childbearing 
intentions and desires among new mothers conducted in 2003 by the National Bureau of Statistics, 
Italian women continue to show a strong desire for motherhood even after the first childbirth. Still, 
the second childbirth has become an even more rare event. It thus seems that the decrease in fertility 
cannot be attributed to a negative attitude towards procreation (Istat 2007, p. 2). This interpretation 
is reinforced by the fact that, according to Istat’s Survey on Births (2007), the desired fertility rate is 
significantly higher than the actual one. This suggests that further investigation is required in order 
to understand the determinants of this gap or, in other words, what curbs the couples’ ambition to 
conceive a second child. 
 
3. The importance of precariousness 
The main aim of the paper is to analyze the socio-economic determinants of a couple’s intention to 
have children in Italy. Our study differentiates itself from the existing literature by: 1) assessing the 
role of the precariousness of women’s employment; 2) focusing on childbearing intentions, instead 
of accounting solely for actual fertility, in order to better evaluate the determinants of the decision 
to have (more) children; 3) assessing at the micro level the possible role of a series of economic 
features of both the components of the couple, instead of focusing on women only.  
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We argue that if the aspiring mother holds a precarious position in the labour market - e.g. she has 
an unstable, low-paid, and insecure job – the couple will be less likely to have the time and the 
material resources for expanding their family. In its “Classification of Status in Employment”, the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines “precarious” workers as either: (a) workers whose 
contract of employment leads to the classification of the incumbent as belonging to the groups of 
“casual workers”
1
; (b) “short-term workers” or “seasonal workers”; or (c) workers whose contract 
of employment will allow the employing enterprise or person to terminate the contract at short 
notice. As stated in the introduction, the concept of labour precariousness is generally disregarded 
by the conventional literature, which considers it more as a side effect of flexibility rather than as a 
crucial, potentially negative, factor related to workers’ well-being. This view can be hardly 
generalized to Italy, where the reform of the labour market implemented in the mid ’90s introduced 
new forms of temporary labour contracts (those used for the so-called parasubordinati and 
interinali
2
). These workers are characterized by low income levels, inadequate social protection and 
discontinuous careers (Cipollone 2001). The Italian social protection system is inadequate “to cope 
with the greater individual insecurity associated with a more flexible labour market”, because of 
“the lack of wage subsidies for the low-paid, and the poor coverage of the unemployment benefits” 
(Brandolini et al. 2007; p. 63 and 59). This inadequacy leads to an increase in the probability of 
being poor for households with non-standard workers: Bank of Italy (2009) shows that in 2006 the 
incidence of poverty for households with only atypical workers was about 47%. Looking in 
particular at childcare welfare systems and parental benefits, in Italy they are in most cases designed 
to meet the needs of permanent workers, leaving women with precarious positions unprotected in 
the case of childbearing (see Ferrera 2005, and Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, for exhaustive reviews 
on the Italian welfare state)
3
.  
Negative effects associated with precarious jobs are more pronounced when temporary contracts are 
used as replacements for (or alternatives to) permanent ones, with the consequence being that 
precarious becomes a long-term status. Young people and women are more exposed to this risk 
(Brandolini et al. 2007; Barbieri and Scherer 2005). There are a number of reasons to expect 
workers to remain “trapped” in precariousness. First, due to the lack of training, the extreme 
flexibility (both in terms of time and mobility), and the worsening in health conditions generally 
                                                 
1
 The ILO defines “casual”  workers as having an explicit or implicit contract of employment which is not expected to 
continue for more than a short period.  
2
 Most parasubordinati are similar to fixed-term employees except that they are paid less and receive lower social 
security contributions, and do not benefit from employment protection legislation (Brandolini et al 2007). Interinali are 
individuals who work through a temporary employment agency. 
3
 Labour precariousness can thus be seen as a barrier to social integration that may destroy human and social capital: a 
high level of employment flexibility hinders training and qualification and, at the same time, hampers the consolidation 
of social ties, both inside and outside the workplace.  
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associated with precarious positions, workers may find it very difficult to upgrade their skills and 
develop new contacts (Benach et al. 2000; Virtanen 2002; Guadalupe 2003; Menendez et al. 2006; 
Kim et al. 2008; Amudeo-Dorantes et al. 2010). The progressive erosion of  the individual stock of 
human and social capital may gradually worsen the chances of making the transition into stable 
employment (Sabatini, 2009). Moreover, as argued by Barbieri and Scherer (2009), there might be a 
stigma associated with precarious or “b-series”, jobs: “not having been selected for the primary 
labour market is interpreted as a negative signal by potential future employers” (p. 678). After a 
certain period of instability, individuals in precarious jobs concretely face the risk of exclusion from 
the labour market (Booth et al. 2002; Dolado et al. 2002; D’Addio and Rosholm 2005). The passage 
from an unstable to a stable position thus is not an easy task that can be fulfilled simply by deciding 
to do it. This is why we argue that precariousness, as we define it in this paper, can be hardly 
considered as the result of a spontaneous choice. In Italy, precarious employment is such a 
disadvantageous condition that just very few women would deliberately prefer it for the seek of a 
more interesting and stimulating job.  
Since the high exposure to the risks of job loss, wage variability, and intermittent unemployment 
raise the uncertainty of future income (making any form of long-term life planning such as marriage 
and procreation difficult), we expect a negative association between the employment precariousness 
of potential parents and their childbearing intentions. 
 
4. Data  
To analyze the impact of employment precariousness on childbearing intentions we use the 2006 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank of Italy. The SHIW 
covers 7,768 households composed of 19,551 individuals and 13,009 income-earners and collects 
data on individual income, wealth, human capital and a range of relevant socio-economic 
behaviours and perceptions. In the 2006 survey, an interesting question on family planning was 
included in the questionnaire, which offers the opportunity for an investigation into the socio-
economic determinants of childbearing intentions at the micro level: “Do you plan to have (more) 
children in the future?” where possible answers were 1) yes, 2) not now, we will think about it later, 
3) No, we don’t want any (more) children, and 4) No, but we would have liked to have (more) 
children
4
. The question was asked only to couples in which the woman was under age 46, and 
responses are provided by the head of the household, who was asked to speak in the name of the 
                                                 
4
 The questionnaire and microdata are available on the Bank of Italy’s web site.  
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couple. After matching household heads’ and partners’ characteristics we have a sub-sample of 
1,696 couples
5
.  
Our dependent variable is the dummy “intention to have (more) children”: 15% of the couples 
report they want children. The main independent variables are dummies representing the work 
status of men and women. In particular, we account for the condition of being unemployed, not 
employed, a precarious employee, a stable employee, and self-employed. As pointed out in Section 
3, we define precarious as holding an unstable position: employees with fixed-term contracts or 
atypical workers. Stable employees are those with an open-ended contract. 
We controlled for women’s age, male and female level of education, the perceived economic well-
being of the couple
6
, the geographical area of residence, marital status, number of children in the 
family, presence of grandparents, and citizenship. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. All 
variables are described in detail in Table A1 in the Appendix. The average ages are 41 and 37 for 
men and women respectively. 47% (41%) of males (females) reported low education, and 42% 
(46%) completed high school. The large majority of men (67%) are employed with a stable job 
(open-ended contract), 21% are self-employed and 6% are precarious. The percentage of women 
who are employed with a stable job is 41%, while 37% are out of the labour force (mainly 
housewives); the percentage of those unemployed and employed with a precarious job are 6% and 
7% respectively. The average number of children is 1.5; 21% (63%) of the couples answer that their 
household’s income is not sufficient (only just sufficient) to satisfy their needs.  
 
                                                 
5
 1,742 households answered the question on family planning. The partner is present in 1696 households; the remaining 
cases are single men or single women. Since we want to control for  the characteristics of both men and women, the 
sample is restricted to include those households in which both the head and the partner are present.  
6
 The perceived economic conditions of the family is given by the interviewees’ response to the question: “Is your 
household’s income sufficient to see you through to the end of the month?”, ranging on a scale from 1 (“with great 
difficulty”) to 6 (“very easily”). We grouped answers into low, medium and good economic well-being. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Plan to have (more) children 1696 0.154 0.362 0 1 
Household characteristics 
Married 1696 0.959 0.198 0 1 
Number of children 1696 1.475 0.991 0 7 
Presence of grandparents  1696 0.015 0.121 0 1 
Perceived poor economic 
well-being 
1696 0.261 0.439 0 1 
Perceived medium economic 
well-being 
1696 0.630 0.483 0 1 
Perceived good economic 
well-being 
1696 0.109 0.312 0 1 
North 1696 0.476 0.500 0 1 
Centre  1696 0.184 0.388 0 1 
South 1696 0.340 0.474 0 1 
Male characteristics 
Age 1696 41.342 6.645 20 69 
None, elementary and middle 
school education  
1696 0.465 0.499 0 1 
High school (diploma) 1696 0.427 0.495 0 1 
Bachelor's degree and 
beyond 
1696 0.107 0.310 0 1 
Not employed 1696 0.051 0.221 0 1 
Self employed 1696 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Employed with stable job 1696 0.673 0.469 0 1 
Precarious 1696 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Italian citizen 1696 0.946    0.225 0 1 
Female characteristics 
Age 1696 37.483 5.646 18 45 
None, elementary and middle 
school education  
1696 0.413 0.492 0 1 
High school (diploma) 1696 0.462 0.499 0 1 
Bachelor’s degree and 
beyond 
1696 0.126 0.331 0 1 
Not employed 1696 0.372 0.483 0 1 
Self employed 1696 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Unemployed 1696 0.056 0.230 0 1 
Employed with stable job  1696 0.416 0.493 0 1 
Precarious 1696 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Italian citizen 1696 0.941 0.236 0 1 
Source: Our calculation from the 2006 SHIW. The sample includes all couples that 
answered the question on family planning. The category “man not employed” includes 
both unemployed and individuals out of the labour force (the latter includes only 21 
observations). “Woman not employed” includes females out of the labour force, 
mainly housewives. 
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5. Methodological framework 
We model childbearing decisions as a binary choice. The dependent variable y may only take the 
values one and zero, which indicate whether the couple is planning to have (more) children in the 
future or not. The decision can be derived from an underlying latent variable model: 
 
* *, 1 0y X e y yβ  = + = >     (1) 
 
where X is the set of independent variables aimed to explain fertility choices (described in section 
4). When e has a standard logistic distribution we can derive the logit model: 
 
[ ]
exp( )
( 1| ) ( )
1 exp( )
X
prob y X G X
X
β
β
β
= = =
+
  (2) 
 
Least squares estimation of (2) may lead to biased estimates of the parameters because of the 
endogeneity of women’s occupational status, and in particular the status of being precarious, which 
is the main point of the paper. In Section 3 we outline how precarious employment can be hardly 
seen as the result of a worker’s deliberate choice. It seems much more reasonable to consider it as a 
situation of disadvantage to which workers have to adapt only if there are no alternatives.  
In order to make the analysis more robust, we perform a regression-based test to check whether 
women’s employment instability is endogenous. We follow a two step procedure: 
1. first we estimate the female labour force participation equation (probit) using all 1,696 
observations; we then use the estimates to calculate the inverse Mills ratio. Explanatory variables 
adopted in the analysis are woman’s age and squared age, woman’s education, household income 
less female income, number of children under age 7, number of children aged 7-18, a dummy for 
home ownership, a dummy for the ownership of a luxury house, the unemployment rate in the 
region of residence
7
.   
2. A regression-based test of endogeneity of women’s employment instability is performed on the 
sample of women that participate in the labour market. Since an instrumental variables estimator for 
probit and logit models with endogenous regressors is not consistent (Dagenais 1999; Lucchetti 
2002; Wilde 2008), we prefer to estimate IV in the Linear Probability Model. If the test fails to 
reject absence of endogeneity, we can go back and use the logit model (2) to estimate the effect of 
women’s employment instability on childbearing intentions.  
                                                 
7
 Estimates are available by request to the authors. 
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To derive the regression-based test, a two stage procedure is used. The first-stage reduced form 
regression has “woman precarious” as dependent variable and all the exogenous variables as 
regressors (the instrumental variable, all exogenous variables included in the childbearing model, 
and the inverse Mills ratio as an extra regressor to control for the selection bias). The instrument for 
job precariousness is the share of precarious workers over the labour force in the region of 
residence
8
. At the second-stage, we regress childbearing intentions on the predicted OLS residuals 
from the first-stage, on the potential endogenous variable (whether the woman is precarious), and 
on all the exogenous variables. A standard t test on the predicted residuals is our test for 
endogeneity. The test fails to reject absence of endogeneity  (t = 0.02, P > |t| = 0.983), hence we 
estimate childbearing intentions using the logit model (2).  
 
6. Results 
Table 4 reports the results of our estimates. Women’s unemployment and precarious employment 
are found to strongly affect childbearing intentions. With respect to couples with permanently 
employed women (which is the reference category), having a precarious job decreases the 
probability of planning to have a child by 3% (see column 2 of Table 4). The effect of being 
unemployed is similar (coefficients and marginal effects are not statically different). The 
explanation seems to be straightforward: unemployed and precariously employed women are not 
encouraged to have children by the lower opportunity cost of childbearing. In most cases, temporary 
female workers with atypical contracts cannot enjoy any form of sick leave or parental benefits. For 
them, pregnancy can be cause for termination of the work relationship by the employer. Female 
atypical workers may thus have to face a trade-off between motherhood and participation in the 
labour market. This choice may be more tragic than it seems, because the job loss possibly caused 
by childbearing: a) is doomed to have further repercussions on the financial conditions and well-
being of the parents; b) can lead women into a “precariousness trap” or even an “unemployment 
trap”. As argued by Del Bono et al. (2008), the job displacement caused by pregnancy may destroy 
all the worker’s specific human capital, thereby worsening the future employability of women. We 
argue that the perspective of losing the job and/or of getting through the end of the month with 
greater (and possibly growing) difficulty may work as a strong dissuasive factor discouraging 
childbearing.  
Couples in which the man has a bachelor’s degree (and beyond) are more likely to want (more) 
children. This association may be due to the better economic conditions probably related to higher 
levels of education. Another possible explanation may be related to the division of domestic labour, 
                                                 
8
 Our calculation is on the basis of data collected from Istat, Ebitemp and Inps.  
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which is likely to be more equal  in couples where men are better educated. The share of domestic 
work performed by formally employed women forms in fact a critical piece of current cross-
national explanations for low fertility (Miller Torr and Shorr 2004). According to McDonald 
(2000), the decline in fertility in high-income countries is the outcome of a conflict or inconsistency 
between high levels of gender equity in education and labour market, and low levels of gender 
equity in the family and family-oriented institutions. This phenomenon has been observed in a 
pioneer empirical study by Hochschild (1989), who found that in the U.S., while female 
participation in the labour market dramatically increased over the last decades, a much less dramatic 
change occurred within domestic life: women are more likely to share the paid work, but men are 
often not much more likely to share the domestic work and childcare. The resulting “extra burden” 
for women can be used to explain lower fertility in advanced economies (Chesnais 1996, Matthews 
1999; McDonald 2000; Miller Torr and Shorr 2004, Cooke 2009). As an interpretation of our 
findings, we argue that men’s education may play a significant role in changing the division of 
domestic labour towards a higher level of gender equity. In our view, this argument is strictly 
related to the previous one. Not only may the job displacement related to childbearing destroy all a 
woman’s specific human capital, as outlined above, it also reduces the rate at which human capital 
is accumulated in the future (Del Bono et al. 2008). Women perceiving the better education of men 
as a source of gender equity may be more confident they will find time to accumulate new specific 
human capital after a childbirth. Such a perspective may soften the fear of facing a career crash as a 
consequence of motherhood.    
As regards men’s occupational status, couples in which the man is self-employed show a higher 
probability of planning childbearing with respect to those where men are employed with open-
ended contracts. Male job instability seems to have no effect on the intention to have children. Self-
employed men in our sample are mainly professionals and entrepreneurs, i.e., men holding a high 
socio-economic status. Such a condition may entail the availability of better resources for raising 
children. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that strands of the social psychology and 
sociological literature claim the existence of a positive relationship between men’s status and 
potential fertility, as estimated by copulation frequency, even in modern, developed, societies 
(Perusse 1993; Kanazawa 2003; Hopcroft 2005, 2006; Hopcroft and Whitmeyer 2010). Using 
pooled data from the U.S. General Social Survey from the period 1989-2000, Hopcroft (2006) finds 
that, for men, status and income increase both potential and achieved fertility by promoting the 
frequency of sex. Even if our data do not detect the sexual habits of the sample (thus we cannot 
make any inference on “potential fertility”), it could be argued that one of the channels positively 
affecting the intention to have children may be the possibly higher frequency of sex related to men’s  
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status. Overall, our result seems to support the thesis that men do not have to face any trade-off 
between fatherhood and their professional career.  
Childbearing intentions increase with the age of the mother, but in a decreasing way (age square has 
a negative impact). Women that are Italian citizens are less likely to plan to have a child: being 
Italian decreases the likelihood by 7%. This result is coherent with census data reporting that 
foreign women, on average, exhibit a one point-higher fertility rate and an age at the first childbirth 
3.8 years lower than that of Italian women (see Table 2 in Section 2). More in general, the ethnicity-
based difference in childbearing intentions confirms a well-established trend already observed in 
developed countries (Feld 2000; Coleman 2006, 2009) and suggests that further investigations on 
migrants’ fertility patterns are required to better understand Italy’s potential to escape the “lowest-
low fertility trap”. 
Household characteristics matter as well. Being married increases the likelihood of planning to have 
a child by 4%. As expected, the number of children, having poor economic conditions and living in 
the North negatively influence couples’ childbearing intentions.  
We also tested whether the effect of precarious employment varies across different segments of the 
population, as grouped on the basis of economic well-being and woman’s age. Table 5 reports the 
estimates for the interaction terms between the dummy representing women’s unemployment or 
precariousness
9
, and the dummies for having poor/medium economic conditions and being young 
(women under 35 years of age). Being on the fringes of the labour market is a significant dissuasive 
factor against childbearing only for couples with poor/medium economic conditions and for young 
women. It has no effect on wealthy women and on those aged between 36-46. This result seems to 
support our hypothesis that one of the main factors influencing the decision to have children is the 
sustainability of parenthood, both in terms of income and labour market participation. For a relevant 
part of the population, the sustainability of childbearing is significantly worsened by the 
precariousness of female employment. After a certain age, the pressure of the “biological clock” 
seems to become strong enough to possibly counterbalance financial straits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 We grouped unemployed and precarious females in order to increase the number of observations. This procedure is 
supported by the fact that coefficients are not statistically different (test based on the model presented in Table 4). 
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Table 4. Estimates of the probability of wanting (more) children 
Variables Coef. 
Marginal 
effects 
   
Married 0.999*** 0.0376*** 
 (0.372) (0.010) 
Number of children -1.371*** -0.076*** 
 (0.114) (0.008) 
Presence of grandparents -1.350 -0.044*** 
 (0.883) (0.015) 
Woman: Italian citizen -0.876*** -0.069** 
 (0.312) (0.033) 
Woman’s age 0.669*** 0.037*** 
 (0.166) (0.009) 
Woman’s age sq -0.012*** -0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.0001) 
Not employed woman -0.151 -0.008 
 (0.219) (0.012) 
Unemployed woman -1.240*** -0.044*** 
 (0.405) (0.009) 
Self employed woman -0.488 -0.023* 
 (0.329) (0.013) 
Precariously employed woman -0.683** -0.029*** 
 (0.326) (0.011) 
Not employed man -0.117 -0.006 
 (0.480) (0.024) 
Self employed man 0.513** 0.033** 
 (0.214) (0.016) 
Precariously employed man 0.034 0.002 
 (0.347) (0.020) 
Man: none, elem. and middle school education -0.741** -0.041** 
 (0.316) (0.018) 
Man: high school -0.540** -0.029** 
 (0.275) (0.015) 
Woman: none, elem. and middle school education -0.074 -0.004 
 (0.304) (0.017) 
Woman: high school -0.224 -0.012 
 (0.256) (0.014) 
Poor economic well-being -0.676** -0.033** 
 (0.334) (0.014) 
Medium economic well-being -0.179 -0.010 
 (0.259) (0.015) 
North -0.682*** -0.038*** 
 (0.216) (0.012) 
Centre -0.384 -0.019* 
 (0.252) (0.011) 
Constant -7.009**  
 (2.785)  
Observations 1696 
Pseudo R2 0.33 
Percentage of correctly specified 86.5% 
Notes: Coefficients and marginal effects for the probability of desiring a child. The sample includes 
all couples that answered the question on family planning. Omitted categories are: bachelor’s 
degree and beyond, employed with stable job, good economic well-being, and the region of 
residence South. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Precarious Employment interacted with economic conditions and woman’s age 
Variables Coef. Coef. 
   
Woman: (precarious or unemployed)*poor/medium 
economic well-being 
-1.204***  
 (0.352)  
Woman: (precarious or unemployed)*medium/good 
economic well-being 
-0.460  
 (0.381)  
Woman: (precarious or unemployed)*age 18-35  -1.397*** 
  (0.330) 
Woman: (precarious or unemployed)*age 35-46  0.116 
  (0.391) 
Poor economic well-being -0.617* -0.701** 
 (0.335) (0.332) 
Medium economic well-being -0.160 -0.181 
 (0.258) (0.260) 
Woman’s age 0.652*** 0.670*** 
 (0.165) (0.167) 
Woman’s age sq -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Married yes Yes 
Number of children yes Yes 
Woman is Italian citizen yes Yes 
Man: none, elem. and middle school education yes Yes 
Man: high school yes Yes 
Woman: none, elem. and middle school education yes Yes 
Woman: high school yes Yes 
Not employed woman yes Yes 
Self employed woman yes Yes 
Not employed man yes Yes 
Self employed man yes Yes 
Precariously employed man yes Yes 
North yes Yes 
Centre yes Yes 
Constant yes Yes 
   
Observations 1696 1696 
Notes: Coefficients for the probability of desiring a child. The sample includes all 
couples that answered the question on family planning. Omitted categories are: 
bachelor’s degree and beyond, employed with stable job, good economic well-
being, and the region of residence South.  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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7. Conclusions 
Besides confirming the reliability of conventional explanations like civil status, age, and economic 
well-being, the empirical analysis in this paper adds new insights to the debate on the drop in 
fertility by supporting an alternative explanation of the postponement of childbearing. The 
instability of female work status is revealed as a significant and strong dissuasive factor against the 
decision to have children, especially for young couples with medium or low incomes. Conventional 
theoretical predictions according to which female participation in the  labour market may be 
responsible for the fall in fertility are not supported by data. On the contrary, unemployed and 
precariously employed women, far from being encouraged to bear children by the lower opportunity 
cost of leaving the labour market, are definitely less likely to plan to have children.  
As outlined in the review of the literature, many authors have properly related the “Italian puzzle”, 
i.e. the combination of low female participation with very low fertility, to differences in the 
institutional and policy framework. In Nordic countries, where more generous policies on parental 
arrangements and childcare assistance have been implemented, the negative association between 
participation and fertility has in fact been reversed. These studies suggest the creation of more part-
time jobs and the improvement of childcare assistance as possible ways to fill the gap (Del Boca 
and Sauer 2009, Del Boca et al. 2009). Here we argue that public actions aimed at raising fertility 
should also take into account appropriate labour market policies. In the Italian labour market, 
flexibility essentially means “precariousness”. Precarious workers have low-paid jobs, with scarce 
or nonexistent guarantees in terms of sick leave and parental benefits, career prospects and training 
opportunities. Everyday-life experience widely suggests that one of the decisive questions that 
employers pose to female candidates in interviews refers to their civil status and childbearing 
intentions. Temporary female workers are well aware that in most cases a pregnancy would be 
cause for termination of the work relationship by the employer, possibly causing a collapse in the 
financial situation of the couple. The resulting trade-off may be unsustainable, both in terms of 
women’s life-satisfaction and of the economic well-being of the couple.  
The demographic consequences of this phenomenon are doomed to become more and more 
important as the share of precarious workers in the labour market constantly grows. The scenario is 
worsened by the ageing of the population, which weakens the economic system’s ability to face 
global competition and blights the sustainability of the pension system. In such a context, labour 
market policies alleviating the precariousness of temporary workers would probably lead to more 
balanced choices in terms of family planning and labour market participation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Detailed description of variables 
Dependent variable 
Plan to have (more) children 
Do you plan to have (more) children in the future?  
1 if Yes 
0 if No 
Household characteristics 
Married 
1 if married 
0 if single, separated/divorced, widowed 
Number of children  
Presence of grandparents  If there are grandparents in the family 
Perceived poor economic well-
being 
Is your household’s income sufficient to see you through to the end 
of the month? 
with great difficulty 
with difficulty 
Perceived medium economic 
well-being 
with some difficulty  
fairly easily 
Perceived good economic well-
being 
easily   
very easily 
North Region of residence of the couple 
Centre  Region of residence of the couple 
South Region of residence of the couple 
Male characteristics 
Age  
None, elementary and middle 
school education  
none 
primary school certificate or 
lower secondary school certificate 
High school (diploma) vocational secondary school diploma (3 years)  
upper secondary school diploma  
Bachelor's degree and beyond 
3 year university degree / higher education diploma 
5-year university degree  
postgraduate qualification 
Not employed 
first job seeker  
unemployed   
independent means  
retired worker  
pensioner (disability/survivor’s pension/old-age welfare benefits) 
student (from primary school up) 
other non-employed (conscript/volunteer/disabled) 
Self employed 
member of profession 
small employer 
own-account worker/craft worker 
owner or member of family business 
working shareholder/partner 
Employed with stable job 1) blue-collar worker or similar (including employees and 
apprentices, homeworkers and sales assistants), 2) office worker, 3) 
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school teacher in any type of school, 4) junior/middle manager, 5) 
senior manager, senior official, school head, director of studies, 
university teacher, magistrate with permanent contract. 
Precarious 
A) 1) blue-collar worker or similar (including employees and 
apprentices, homeworkers and sales assistants), 2) office worker, 3) 
school teacher in any type of school, 4) junior/middle manager, 5) 
senior manager, senior official, school head, director of studies, 
university teacher, magistrate with fixed-term or temporary 
contract. 
B) contingent worker on own account (regular or occasional 
collaborator, project worker, etc.). 
Italian citizen 1 if Italian citizen 
Female characteristics 
Age  
None, elementary and middle 
school education  
none 
primary school certificate or 
lower secondary school certificate 
High school (diploma) vocational secondary school diploma (3 years)  
upper secondary school diploma 
Bachelor's degree and beyond 
3 year university degree/higher education diploma 
5-year university degree  
postgraduate qualification 
Not employed 
homemaker 
independent means  
retired worker  
pensioner (disability/survivor’s pension/old-age welfare benefits) 
student (from primary school up) 
other non-employed (conscript/volunteer/disabled) 
Self employed 
member of profession 
small employer 
own-account worker/craft worker 
owner or member of family business 
working shareholder/partner 
Unemployed first job seeker  
unemployed   
Employed with stable job  
1) blue-collar worker or similar (including employees and 
apprentices, homeworkers and sales assistants), 2) office worker, 3) 
school teacher in any type of school, 4) junior/middle manager, 5) 
senior manager, senior official, school head, director of studies, 
university teacher, magistrate with permanent contract. 
Precarious 
A) 1) blue-collar worker or similar (including employees and 
apprentices, homeworkers and sales assistants), 2) office worker, 3) 
school teacher in any type of school, 4) junior/middle manager, 5) 
senior manager, senior official, school head, director of studies, 
university teacher, magistrate with fixed-term or temporary 
contract. 
B) contingent worker on own account (regular or occasional 
collaborator, project worker, etc.). 
Italian citizen 1 if Italian citizen 
Source: 2006 SHIW. 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics  
 Code Description Female Male 
   Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
1  Blue-collar worker or similar 
(including employees and 
apprentices, homeworkers and 
sales assistants) 
312 18.40 686 40.45 
2  Office worker 363 21.40 395 23.29 
3 School teacher in any type of 
school (including teachers with 
term appointments, those 
under special contracts and 
similar) 
81 4.78 31 1.83 
4 Junior/middle manager 41 2.42 89 5.25 P
ay
ro
ll
 e
m
p
lo
y
ee
 
5 Senior manager, senior 
official, school head, director 
of studies, university teacher, 
magistrate 
12 0.71 37 2.18 
6 Member of profession 33 1.95 71 4.19 
7 Small employer 11 0.65 36 2.12 
8 Own-account worker/craft 
worker 
41 2.42 169 9.96 
9 Owner or member of family 
business 
38 2.24 36 2.12 
S
el
f-
em
p
lo
y
ed
 
10 Working shareholder/partner 18 1.06 53 3.12 
11 First-job seeker 34 2.00 8 0.47 
12 Unemployed 61 3.60 58 3.42 
13 Homemaker 624 36.79   
14 Independent means   1 0.06 
15 Retired worker   14 0.83 
16 Pensioner disability/survivor’s 
pension/old-age welfare 
benefits) 
2 0.12 6 0.35 
17 Student (from primary school 
up) 
5 0.29   
18 Pre-school-age child     
N
o
t 
em
p
lo
y
ed
 
19 Other non-employed 
(conscript/volunteer/disabled) 
    
C
o
n
ti
n
g
en
t 
w
o
rk
er
 
o
n
 o
w
n
 
ac
co
u
n
t 
20 contingent worker on own 
account (regular or occasional 
collaborator, project worker, 
etc.) 
20 1.18 6 0.35 
 TOT  1696 
Source: 2006 SHIW. 
 
 
